Nase Novine, December 12, 1985

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m'31i THE NEW "DIRTY WAR" rJekuligsuo....slavia
Upon the triumph of the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua in July of 1979, ex-memb- ers of
the 'Guardia Nacional' established them-selves
in neighbouring Hounduras, prima-rily
in the departments of El Paraiso and
Cholvteca. At the same time training
camps for them were set up in California
and Florida. They were formed under the
general name of "Contrarevolucionarios"
as Contras.
The Contras are composed of various
elements the main guerilla group, the
Fuerga Democratica Nicaragueuse (FON)
is made up of the following groups: the
Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN),
the Alianza Democratica Revolucionaria
Nicaraguense (ADREN), and the Legion
15 de Septembre. In 1981 the Miskito group
Misura joined the rank of the FDN. This
organization operates from bases inside
Hondurian territory.
To the south of Nicaragua, another Con-tra
group was established. They are called
the Alianza Revolucionarna Democratica
(ARDE), led by former Sandinista Eden
Pastora Another Miskito group, Misurata,
was integrated with ARDE. This organiza-tion
operated from inside Costa Rica, but
since 1984 the Misurata has separated
from ARDE
As it stands now, the FDN has nine re-gional
commando units, commandos Nica-ra- o,
Segovia, Diriangen, Rafaela Herrera,
Jorge Salazar, San Jacinto, Jose Dolores,
Andres Castro and Juan Castro. The comm-ander-
in-chief of the FDN is Adolfo Ca-ler- o.
Before developing offensive military
plans, the Contras had been grouped
along the Honduras border. It was not un-til
1982 that the southern front became
part of the Contra forces. At first, 'Plan A',
it was decided that the northern towns in-cluding
Talapa, Oadal and Somoto would
be the war front, and once these towns
were taken, a 'Liberated zone' could be
declared and recognized by Honduras El
Salvador and the United States, with pro-visional
gr'ernments set up.
Based on this, in 1981 Misura made their
own plans to gain control of areas along
the Altantic coast, especially Puerto Ca-bezu- s, and code-name- d this 'Red Chris-tmas'.
When both of these attempts failed,
'Plan C was developed. This would consist
of three stages. "Siembra", "Marathon",
and "Sierra". Each one again had its aim
to capture towns in the north, this time
not just the main towns. However, this
plan also proved to be unfruitful, and fi-nally
this policy was abandoned in Fe-bruary
of 1984. A new tactic had to be fol-lowed.
This was to be 'Plan Ofensiva Gene-ralizada- ':
targets would now become eco-nomic
in the zones of Tinotega and Mata-galp- a, two regions further south than the
previous towns.
Destabilizing tactics at this point were
not new for the Contras. They had started
in February 1982 with a bomb exploding
in the Managua airport, resulting in four
civilian deaths. Until this time, raids were
generally carried out in cross-bord- er in-cursions
on small villages, terrorizing the
local population. The Contras would re- treat into Honduran territory after attac-king
bordering towns.
February 1982 brought a split in Contra
activities. One wing would continue car-rying
out raids on small civilian grou-pings,
including schools, hospitals, day-care
centres and churches, as well as am-bushing
food and medical supplies. Now,
a new wing emerged, forming a small num-ber
of well-traine- d and specialized com-battan- ts that would target economic life-lines
of the country. Washington policy-makers
hoped that forcing the Sandinistas
to divert more and more resources to de-fense
would cripple the social program-mes
they were so proud of and increase
public discontent with its government.
Thus a new system of counter 'revolutio-nary
projects' resulted. These consisted
of blowing up bridges, raiding co-operativ- es, burning the export crops such as to-bacco
and coffee, mining of the major
ports (Corinto, Puerto Cabezas, San Juan
del Sur) which resulted in the sinking of
several oil tankers, bombing oil refine-ries,
and naval blockades.
The degree of intensity and frequency
of Contra attacks has risen steadily since
1981. The physical damage and loss of pro-duction
is valued at U.S. $392.9 million, a
large amount for a country of 3 million
inhabitants. The number of victims inclu-des
2,817 dead; 3,020 wounded; 2,825 kid-napped;
114 women raped; 142,980 displa-ced;
and 6,239 orphans.
What are the Contras' aspirations by
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these means? According to a spokesman
for the Conservative Democratic Party
(PCD), the political wing in Managua of
the Contras, the objective is to destabilize
the country to an extent where a military
occupation is possible, not saying of
whose forces this would consist. In Ciudad
Antiqa, a northern town, a captured Con-tra
told the international press that the
whole country would fall within six
months since Matagalpa was already un-der
Contra control, or so his commander
had informed him. This was in 1983.
Why have the Contras not succeeded in
their aims to take town by town as the San-dinistas
had done? The Contras are com-posed
of ten to fifteen thousand combat-tants- ,
yet these numbers include people
in training and reserve units, bringing the
number of active soldiers to between four
and six thousand currently inside Nicara-gua- n
territory. The Nicaraguan forces ea-sily
excede this figure, however what
counts more in guerilla warfare is mobi-lity
and local support. The Contras have
advantage in the former, normally compri-sing
groups of several hundred soldiers,
half the size of Sandinista batallions. In
the latter category the Contras are at a
disadvantage. This explains their lack of
clearly-define- d control zones. They often
receive air-dropp- ed supplies from Cessna
and various other planes. The rural sup-port
which they do posess is normally the
result of threats, terrorization, or holding
village members hostage in exchange for
storage facilities. On the southern front,
some Contras have recently had to sell
their ammunition for money to buy food.
Thus the main reason for the non-realizati- on
of Contra goals has been opposition
at the rural level. Each town, even some
villages, has a defense committee (CDS)
which sets up plans for full participation
of the citizens in case of an attack. Talapa
is only five kilometers from the Honduran
border yet has been the epitome of rural
resistance. The townspeople are extre-mely
mobilizing, and of a very adamant
breed. Nearby, four tobacco warehouses
were burnt, valved at U.S. $300,000 each,
yet the farmers refused a government of-fer
of relocation for the community, and
started the insemination process again.
What is the complicity of the U.S.A. in
Contra activities? The United States has
supported the Contras in two domains: fi-nancial
and military. On the former, since
November 1981 the total figure for U.S.
aid has been U.S. $73.95 million, plus $27
to 32 million for the next fiscal year in
'humanitarian aid'. On the latter, support
has been in the form of military advisors,
equipment, intelligence, and organizing
orchestaring manoeuvers. There are ap-proximately
2,250 U.S. personnel in Hon-duras,
consisting of engineers, intelli-gence
agents, and technicians. In Costa
Rica there are abaout 200, mainly engi-neers
and construction workers. The mili-tary
equipment supplied to the Contras
ranges from RPG-- 7 raket lauchers to Su-per
Mystery B-- 2, C-13- 0, Push Pull, TR-- 1
planes. From American territory there
have been 447 and 314 violations of Nica-raguan
airspace and waters respectively,
from 1981 to June 1985. Some of the aerial
violations have been by supersonic intel
ligence-gatherin- g planes which are man-ned
by U S military personnel
Some of the most damaging attacks by
the Contras have been during or immedia-tely
following military manoeuvers and
exercises, in Honduran tentory or off the
Pacific Coast. These include: "Ahvas Tara
II" using 5,000 U.S personnel, including
amphibions crafts, inflantry and aviation
support; "Granadero I" using 2,000 Ameri-can
parsonnel from infantry, aviation, in-telligence
and naval battalions; and "Uni-versal
Trek" with 6,500 marines. In gene-ral
these manoeuvers are carried out with
American bi-mot- or helicopters, combat
planes, aircraft carriers, frigates, and de-stroyers.
Why is the U S.A. invovled in these acti-vities7
Citing mainly political reasons (Ni-caragua
is said to be a communist, totali-tarian
state), the Reagan Administration
hopes to put economic pressure on the
Sandinistas to keep them in line. For
example, in May 1984, the U S. cut its im-ports
of Nicaraguan sugar by ninety per-cent,
from 58,000 tons to 6,000 this was an-nounced
as "getting tough with the Sandi-nistas".
However, the loss was mainly to
the private sector, which owns sixty per-cent
of that industry. In fact, that is rough-ll- y
the percentage of the private sector in
the whole of the Nicaraguan economy,
with the public sector at about forty per-cent.
As for international alignment, three
quarters fo all foreign aid to Nicaragua in
1984 came from the E.E.C. and Latin Ame-rica
(not Cuba), while socialist countries
made up 21 percent of the total.
What are the results of these policies?
Besides intesifying a military infrastruc-ture
in the region, two effects may take
place within Nicaragua. Firstly, attacks
on the country will only produce more op-position
to them and thus more unity
among the citizens of Nicaragua. That is
the psychological effect. Secondly, the
more resovrces that are needed for de-fence
the war effort, the more the gover-nment
will hit the private sector, and by
so doing will have to resort to more radical
policies. This may lead to further justifi-cation
on the part of the U.S.A. to support
the Contras and thus create a self-fullfil-li- ng
prophecy. One may ask if the aim of
the Reagan Administration is to promote
a more radical international image of Ni-caragua,
one that can be inextricably tied
to the Cuban example. That is an impor-tant
question which as of yet has gone un-answered.
Sean Gacich
SSSK SA.EP
ZAMJATIN:
IKAD GORE
Predstavnik sovjetske partije
Leonid Zamjatin smatra da od-no- si
SAD i SSSR nikad nisu bili
gori, osim prije 1933. godine
kada dvije zemlje nisu imale
diplomatske odnose
NEW YORK — Predstavnik sovjet-ske
partije Leonid Zamjatin ocijenio
je sadasnje sovjetsko-americk- e od-nose
kao vrlo lo§e. U intervjuu, koji
objavljuje najnoviji "Newsweek" Za-mjatin
je rekao da ti odnosi gotovo
nikad prije nisu bili tako losi. On je
dodao da se od 1980. godine sovjetsko-americ- ki odnosi pogorsavaju svakog
mjeseca.
Prema rijecima Zamjatina, odnosi
SSSR i SAD nisu bili nikada gori,
osim prije 1933. godine, kada dvije
zemlje nisu imale diplomatske odno-se.
Na predstojecem susretu sovjet-sko- g
vode Mihaila Gorbacova i ame-ricko- g
predsjednika Ronalda Reaga-na-,
predvidenom za novembar u Ge-nev- i,
Zamjatin ce pratiti Gorbacova.
Zamjatin je u intervjuu izjavio da
ce Sovjetski Savez susret smatrati us-pjeSn- im
ako se na njemu bode mogao
definirati pristup za rje§avanje glav-ni- h suvremenih problema. Glavni za-dat- ak je — prema Zamjatinu — da se
obustavi trka u naoruzanju i stvore
uvjeti koji ce iskljuciti mogucnost su-kobljava- nja.
Cvrsto verujem da narodi Jugosla-vij- e
nemaju alternativu Jugoslaviji,
da su duboko pogresne teze, teorije i
verovanja da bi pojedini narodi van
Jugoslavije mogli da ostvare veci ste-pe- n identiteta nego sto su ga ostvarili
u Jugoslaviji. To nije samo zabluda
nego i velika laz. Na zalost, mi takve
teorije pocesto slusamo, kao sto slu-sam- o
i tezu da tek treba dokazati ko-risno- st Jugoslavije.
(Misa Pavicevic,
clan Saveta Federacije)
Svi mi zivio u Jugoslaviji. Samo tako
mozemo da nastavimo. A, da li je nase
poreklo od Veneta, Trojanaca, Kelta,
Albanaca, Srba, pa to nikoga ne inte-resuj- e
to nije ni vazno, najvaznije je
biti covek. To obicnog coveka i ne in-teresu- je. Neka oni sto to izmisljaju
vise gledaju kako cemo sutra, a ne sta
je bilo pre tri veka...
(Boris Kovac,
tekstilac iz Maribora,
ucesnik "Voza
bratstvo-jedinstvo- ")
Bolnica
Bili su to, a i sada jesu, ljudi poseb-no- g kova. Oni su znali samo za svoje
obaveze u bolnici i njima se posveci-val- i
citavim svojim bicem. Njihova
stremljenja nisu bilausmerena na sti-can- ju laskavih titula zvanja, a cesto
su bili bolji i od profesora i od drugih
nosilaca akademskih i drugih zvu6-ni- h titula u medicini. Najvise prizna-nj- e
za njih bilo je i jeste prvi plac
novorodenceta, zivahan pogled izle-ceno- g bolesnika i zahvalnost u ocima
operisanog pacijenta, koji znaju da se
nalaze u sigurnim rukama i pod briz-no- m paznjom. Sve je to stvaralo, a ve-rujem
da ce i dalje stvarati, neku
vrstu narodne legende o svojim leka-rima.- ..
(Branko Pesic,
na proslavi dva veka
Zemunske bolnice)
Crkva
Mi smo siroko demokratsko
drustvo, bez cenzure, koje treba da
bude liberalno za sva vredna dela
kulture i civilizacije, da se ona stam-paj- u
i dodu do ljudi. Ali, na zalost,
takva nasa orijentacija ponekad je za
pojedince znak da se jave i sa delima
koja su protiv bratstva i jedinstva,
koji hoce da rehabilituju nase protiv-nik- e
izrevolucije. One koje smo u oru-zan- oj
revoluciji pobedili — ustase i
cetnike.
(Vidoje Zarkovic,
predsednik PredsedniStva
CK SK SKJ)
Covek
Radni6ka klasa je u svakom slucaju
jedinstvena a nacionalisti nam dele
drzavu na osam delova. Svaki pravi
covek, bilo radnik bilo rukovodilac je
— Jugosloven...
(Branko Hermin,
elektroinstalater iz
bjelovarskog "Elektrometala")
Lektira
Najgora stvar koja vam se moze do-godi- ti,
jeste da vas ubace u skolsku
lektiru. Jer vam se moze desiti ka Ma-zurani- cu
i Njegosu, da vas posle izba-cuju.- ..
(Milorad Pavic,
knjizevnik)