Nase Novine, December 19, 1985

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овипљ амешске LETTERS FROM NICARAGUA
Kako se и uvodnom delu novog pro-gra- ma
kPSS zakljucuje daje "imperi-jaliza- m
SAD citadela medunarodne
reakcije ". — Na kraju se ipak dopusta
da postoje ' 'objektivne pretpostavke za
plodotvornu sovjetsko-americk- u sarad-nj- u
u interesu sprecavanja ratne opa-snost- i"
U trenutku kada svetsku i ovdasnju
javnost sve vise zaokupljaju razmislja-nj-a
i predvidanja o stvarnim perspekti-vam- a
susreta Reagana i Gorbacova
ovog meseca u Genevi, razumljivo je
da se sa posebnom paznjom analiziraju
i izucavaju oni delovi upravo objavlje-no- g
novog teksta programa KPSS koji
su posveceni ocenama medunarodnih
zbivanja.
Tome doprinosi i osecanje da se od-no- si
dve zemlje sve vise hlade i kvare
u predvecerje samita. U Moskvi su i
dalje veoma nezadovoljni cinjenicom
da zvanicni Washington jos uvek nije
"ni temeljno ni konstruktivno" odgo-vori- o
na inicijative Mihaila Gorbacova
pokrenute u Parizu i koje bi, po sovjet-ski- m
ocenama, trebalo da posluze kao
osnova za vodenje pregovora.
U novinama se i na televiziji veoma
o§tro i krajnje nepovoljno komentarise
istupanje americkog predsednika Rea-gana
u Ujedinjenim nacijama. "Prav-da- "
izmedu ostalog pi§e da, iako je
predsednik rekao da se nuklearni rat ne
moze dobiti i zato ga ne treba ni voditi
"on se, na zalost nije odrekao od pla-niran- ja
takvog rata".
U Moskvi se takode odbacuje i Rea-gano- va
ideja da u Genevi treba razgo-vara- ti
o tzv. "regionalnim problemi-ma- ".
Imperijalizam kao umiruci
kapitalizam
Sve ovo ukazuje da genevsko nebo
pred sastanak na vrhu nece biti mnogo
vedro i da je sve manje optimizma u
o£ekivanjima. Upravo zbog toga se od-gov- ori
o buducoj sovjetskoj spoljnoj
politici i strategy i sa interesovanjem
traze u novom programskom tekstu koji
se opsirno bavi i medunarodnim odno-sim- a.
Uocavaju sedvatona. U prvomdelu,
gde se daje globalna ideolosko-istorij-sk- a
ocena savremenih kretanja u svetu
pristup je, rekli bismo, ostriji. Uz na-glas- ak
da je u toku proces prelaska iz
kapitalizma u socijalizam, koji je po-st- ao
svetski sistem, naglasava se da se
"kriza kapitalizma produbljuje". Is-ti- ce
se da sada postoje tri vodeca centra
"meduimperijalistickog suparniStva":
Sjedinjene Drzave, Zapadna Evropa i
Japan i "Medu njima sve vise jaca kon-kurents- ka borba".
0 Sjedinjenim Drzavama je receno
sledece: "Citadela medunarodne reak-cije
je imperijalizam SAD. Upravo od
njega potice sva opasnost rata. Preten-duju- ci
na svetsko gospodstvo on samo-zvan- o
proglaSava citave kontinente zo-no- m
svojih zivotnih interesa".
Navodi se, takode, da "nikakvamo-difikacija- "
i manevri savremenog kapi-talizma
"ne mogu da izmene zakone
njegovog razvoja... niti da izvedu
osudeni kapitalisti£ki sistem iz sveobu-hvatn- e
krize..." Postavlja se i defini-cij- a
"daje imeprijalizam truli i umiruci
kapitalizam u predve£erje socijalistiCke
revolucije..."
Pitanje rata i mira
Opisujuci dalje savremene meduna-rodne
odnose kao veoma zategnute,
pune opasnosti od izbijanja rata, za sta
se sva odgovornost pripisuje imperija-lizm- u,
u programu se naglaSava da je
najaktuelniji problem naseg vremena
"pitanje rata i mira". Jedino resenje i
izlaz se vidi u ostvarivanju "mirne
koegzistencije" medu drzavama sa
razlicitim drustvenim uredenjem.
Druga poruka je da "nema fatalne ne-izbezn- osti
od svetskog rata" odnosno
da se mir moze sacuvati.
U trecem odeljku program govori o
prakticmm zadacima KPSS u spoljnoj
politici i poseban deo posvecen je od-nosi- ma
sa kapitalistickim zemljama.
Tu je pristup znatno siri i elasticniji pa
se polazi od konstatacije "da socijali-zam
dokazuje svoje prednosti ne silom
oruzja vec iskljucivo silom primera u
svim oblastima drustvenog zivota..."
Kaze se da KPSS smatra da su "re-volucije
zakonomerni rezultat klasne
borbe u svakoj zemlji" i da takode
smatra daje "principijelno apsolutno
neprihvatljiva" eksport revolucija, na-tura- nje
bilo kome revolucija spolja.
Isto tako se odmah naglasava "daje i
svaki izvoz kontrarevolucija najgrublje
posezanje na slobodu naroda..."
Kao osnovni principi miroljubive
koegzistencije navode se: odustajanje
od rata i primene sile u medunarodnim
odnosima, resavanje spornih pitanja
pregovorima, uzajamno vodenje ra-cu- na
o zakonitim interesima, pravo
svakog naroda da samostalno odlucuje
o svojoj sudbini, strogo uvazavanje su-verenit- eta
zemalja, ravnopravna sarad-nja.- ..
D. PESIC
"Politika"
r3KO
stvara
„negativm
Pravi je problem da o Oureti6evoj knjizi
„Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna drama"
progovore, prije svega, beogradski povje- -
snicari
njiga Veselina Buretica ,,Saveznici
i jugoslovenska ratna drama" jest
i nacin da se u medijima stvori novi
,,negativnl junak". Jos je indikativnije sto 8
je to u malogradanskim krugovima i
dijelu inteligencije Dureticu bila svoje- -
vrsna preporuka da na velika vrata ude u i
„svetiste" suvremenih „mucenika", zbog
„hrabrog" zastupanja, tzv. „nacionalnih
interesa". Tu istu „manu" ili „vrlinu",
kako je tko vec shvaca, u svakoj pogod-no- j
prilici iskazuju „heroji" tipa Dobrice
Cosf6a, Matije Bedkovida, Antonija Isako-vic- a
. . . S obzirom na to da za sve njih
izuzetnu brigu pokazuje upravo Srpska
akademija nauka i lumetnosti, izgleda da
„freneticna" promocija Bureticeve knjige
u svecanoj dvorani ove institucije, ima u
najmanju ruku simbolicno znacenje" --
pise, izmedu ostalog, zagrebacki tjednik
„Danas" pa nastavlja":
,,U cijeloj su ovoj otuznoj prici za-cije- lo
u pravu oni koji tvrde da se „Bure-ticima- "
najvise raduju njihovi „antipodi"
u Zagrebu, Ljubljani, Pristini koji ce se
sada svojski upinjati da dokazu kako se
radi, o samo njima prepoznatljivoj
„srpskoj" zavjeri. Pravi je problem, da-kl- e,
u tome da povjesncari od imena
i reputacije, prije svega beogradski, ko-nacn- o
progovore. Dok oni jos sute, „car-§ijom- "
ce kruziti fame da su" politicari
rekli „ono sto moraju", ali da se Bureti-6- a
njegove kolege ne zele odreci".
DIFFERENT GROUPS
Nicaragu is a war-tow- n country, one
that requires a massive, rural-base- d
support to defend it. Popular Militias
are set up to provide the manpower
for the defence, but much of it comes
from the determination of the people.
At the July 19th celebrtions, 500,000
people turned up to show their sup-port
for the revolution and FSLN, a
remarkable number for a country of
three million inhabitants.
However, not everyone is caught up
in the revolutionary fervor. There are
three groups which are steadfastly
opposed to the government: the reac-tionary
politicians (mostly ex-somoci-s- tas who didnt flee the country), the
big businessmen, and the church hie-rarchy.
The first group is allowed to fun-ction
by the Sandinistas' liberal po-licy
of freedom of the press, one that
is in stark contrast to that of El Salva-dor,
for example. The candidates are
permitted to campaign openly wit-hout
any fear for their safety or thet
of their families; again, in strident op-position
to the practises of other cen-tral
american countries. No one has
ever been killed or threatened while
stating his or her opposition to any
policy of the government's. The lar-gest
daily newspaper, La Prensa, is
staunchly anti-Sandinis- ta and sup-ports
every U.S. position, even when
the Contras attack a Nicaraguan
town.
The second group, represented by
the political lobby group COSEP, has
vested interests in having a conserva-tive
government. The big "busines-smen
are connected to international
finance and have close contacts with
New York, London, Miami etc. They
would profit monetarily if another
Somoza was in power. It is their com-panies
which would be able to expro-priate
into Swiss banke accounts the
profits generated inside the country.
The third group is a small group,
but one that many have considerable
Ortega
appeal to the population. The Catho-lic
church as an institution is divided
in it's position the revolution and the
policies of the sandinista gover-nment.
The priests and ministers
which are in constent contact with the
majority of the population are sup-portive
of the revolutionary process.
They point to the social progress
which has developed, such as the illi-teracy
rate decline grom 52% to 10%,
the increase of the federal budget for
health by 500%, the establishing of
unions & unemployment insurance,
the dramatic decline of diseases like
polio, malaria, dengue, and the
reform. These priests can some-times
hold important positions, such
as Padre Miguel D'Escoto, who is M-inister
of Foreign Affairs the gover-nment.
The hierarchy of the church,
though, is not with the revolution or
the people. They lecture a small per-centage
of the population, but receive
money for their pronouncements.
The epitome of this is Cardinal M-iguel
Obando, who was recently made
a cardinal by the Pope himself. He
has received over U.S. $600,000 to
make his campaign against the peo-ple.
Nicaraguan daily life can thus be
characterized by a wealthy few trying
to influence the behaviour of the go-vernment
to suit their political be-liefs
or economic interests. One can
only wait to see if these few manage
to gain any ground.
Fifteen minuites by car from Esteli,
a city in northern Nicaragua, the coo-perative
Games Garmenda is located.
It covers 1,408 manzanas (1 manzana
equals 0.7 hectares) and comprises a
work force of thirtyfive men. It is not
unlike other cooperatives in the area,
some bigger, some are smaller. It pro-duces
staples such as beans, corn, to-matoes,
cabbage, potatoes and a type
of sugar cane which is fed to the cat-tle.
The cooperative has been in exi-stence
for six years, having been for-med
immediately following the as- cension to power of the Sandinistas.
The land belonged to the former M-inister
of Education, a close friend of
Somoza. Except for 138 manzanas
which were expropriated, the land
was bought on behalf of the workers
by the state, and thus the new owners
were issued titles. This puts the wor-kers
about 4 million cordobas in debt
(over $6,000 U.S.) and according to the
head accountant, it should be paid of
in four to five years.
The land was used for tobacco un- der Somoza, and work was seasonal.
The culture was changed for political
as well as economical reasons. Firs-tly,
the soil is not ideal for growing
tobacco, and it promotes dependence
on a lot of scarce machinery to work
the land. The critical reason, howe- -
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in
ver, was that the workers have more
use for the foodstuffs they take home
as part payment for their input. As
one worker who picked tobacco be-fore
the revolution summed up, "Be-fore
I only worked part of the year.
Now I have a full-tim- e, year-roun- d
job. I have gained my self-respe- ct in
becoming part owner, manager and
labourer, and now it is not someone
else who is making decisions which
effect me on my behalf."
The physical defense of the coope-rative
requires a constant vigil, and
one worker is on a regional committe,
representing his cooperative. He has
frequent briefings on recent attacks
in the area. As the President of the
cooperative explained, "The defense
of this cooperative is essential. We
cannot afford to be unprepared in the
case of an attack, which would leave
us all dead. Patria Libre o Morir!"
Sean GACICH